No moves to lift sanctions on Turkey yet

It appears that there has been no significant progress over the past week in the technical discussions regarding the potential lifting of US sanctions against Turkey.
The sanctions were imposed under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) after Turkey purchased the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system from Russia. They resulted in Turkey being excluded from co-production, and eventual purchase, of the advanced F-35 multirole aircraft.
This apparent, albeit possibly temporary, stall in momentum for a swift resolution, which had gained traction following the phone call between Presidents Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, can likely be attributed to four key factors. The strong reactions from Israel, which have been coordinated with Greece. The rapid deterioration in relations between Jerusalem and Ankara. The negative publicity surrounding the possible sale of the F-35s to Ankara, mainly driven by the Greek-American lobby in the US. And the fallout from the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu.
This mood was evident in Congress, particularly in the harsh statements made by Senator Jim Risch, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during the confirmation hearing of Tom Barrack, a close Trump friend and the next US Ambassador to Turkey. Additionally, the assurance provided by Representative Gregory Meeks, ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that Turkey would not receive the F-35s reflects the broader unease surrounding the issue.
While these statements are significant, the Foreign Relations and International Committees – in which the two lawmakers hold leadership roles – do not have the power to block developments outright. If the US President is determined to proceed with the sale of the fighter jets to Turkey, he has the executive authority to bypass any refusal by the committees, which do not have veto power (as has been erroneously reported multiple times), but only the ability to submit a “hold.”
In the event of such a hold, the President can bypass it and directly notify both chambers of Congress about his decision. At this stage of the process, any legislator can introduce a “resolution of disapproval” against the President’s proposal. For such a resolution to take effect, it must be approved by two-thirds of both the House and the Senate, a scenario that is practically impossible in a Republican-controlled Congress.
For context, this occurred in July 2019, when Congress disagreed, as a protest over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, with the proposed sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia. President Trump vetoed the resolutions of disapproval that reached the Oval Office and proceeded with the sale, citing national security concerns and the situation in Yemen. As a reminder, when Senator Robert Menendez, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, insisted that under his leadership the sale of F16s to Turkey would not proceed, he did so because he knew that President Biden would not go against Congress’s will. This dynamic no longer applies in today’s Washington.
Meanwhile, several Turkish media outlets, whose reports are also being reproduced in Greece, claim that, as part of the technical consultations for the possible lifting of the sanctions, the modification of the CAATSA law is under discussion. This reporting is not accurate, as the specific law addresses the countering of America’s adversaries through sanctions _ specifically Russia, Iran, and North Korea _ so there is no question of modifying it. Section 231 of the law, which was the basis for the decision on Turkey, imposes sanctions on those who engage in transactions with the Russian Federation’s defense or intelligence sectors. The US State Department’s decision explicitly states that “the United States seeks to continue our decades-long history of productive defense-sector cooperation by removing the obstacle of Turkey’s S-400 possession as soon as possible.” This determination could be modified under certain scenarios, opening up the possibility for developments.
While there are efforts toward lifting sanctions, efforts are simultaneously underway to block them. An idea being floated in Washington involves the potential application in Turkey’s case of the Israel Qualitative Military Edge (QME) law over regional adversaries. Since 2008, when the Arms Export Control Act was amended, US law has ensured that arms sales to Middle Eastern countries should not undermine Israel’s military advantage and technological superiority. This has been a cornerstone of US policy for decades, but it has never been applied to Turkey, as it is a NATO member country.