Critical infrastructure: Irish gas and electricity supplies are highly vulnerable to attack

Storm Éowyn showed how precarious Ireland's infrastructure is. In an increasingly fraught period in world politics, Security Correspondent Cormac O'Keeffe examines the potential consequences of sabotage on our subsea connections
Critical infrastructure: Irish gas and electricity supplies are highly vulnerable to attack

The island of Ireland has three subsea electricity interconnectors, all linking to Britain (see map below). This site in Youghal, Co Cork, is about to become the Irish landfall of the fourth, the Celtic Interconnector linking our electricity grid to the French network. Picture: Howard Crowdy

Recent dramatic headlines urging Irish people to stockpile survival kits to last for three days was just the latest bulletin from a world swirling with uncertainty and turmoil.

The emergency call from the European Commission in the last week of March, was not just to Irish people, as some headlines here suggested — but to people from all 27 member states.

Still, it piled on more anxiety for many, forcing them to mentally consider and physically check what they would need in case of some natural disaster, cyberattack, pandemic, or armed conflict.

ESB Networks was just one of the organisations scrambled to restore power, internet, and water after Storm Éwoyn. Analysts are saying the storm is a wake-up call about the vulnerability of Ireland's infrastructure. Picture: Larry Cummins
ESB Networks was just one of the organisations scrambled to restore power, internet, and water after Storm Éwoyn. Analysts are saying the storm is a wake-up call about the vulnerability of Ireland's infrastructure. Picture: Larry Cummins

Some Irish people might have raised an eyebrow, others might even have laughed at the idea. A small number probably thought it was more scare tactics from people they dismiss as “warmongers”.

But, less than two months ago, hundreds of thousands of Irish people, were left in a similar situation — in many cases for a lot longer than 72 hours — thanks to Storm Éowyn. 

Storm Éowyn, which hit towards the end of January, knocking out electricity affecting 780,000 premises, was described by the Government as “unprecedented” in scale. 

Over 130,000 people were still awaiting reconnection after six days. In many cases, homes had no heating.

The power outage had a ripple effect on critical infrastructure, including water, with 200,000 premises affected — standing at 7,500 after a week.

Mobile phone networks and the internet went down, not only cutting verbal communication but also denying access to crucial updates on the websites of critical utilities. Local deputies told the Dáil of 999 calls not getting through. 

Tetra, the emergency services’ secure communication network went down for a period.

The lack of backup generators indicated a serious lapse in our resilience. The EU and individual countries assisted, with 18 generators supplied through EU budgets and/or with the assistance of the Romanian Air Force.

Critical infrastructure

This event — albeit caused by nature and not a hostile state — is a sharp reminder of the role critical infrastructure such as electricity, heating, water, and telecoms have in society.

The Government warned that severe weather events are likely “to increase in frequency and in intensity” with climate change.

Last month, in Britain, another piece of crucial infrastructure was shut down when one of Europe’s busiest airports, Heathrow, suffered a power outage after a fire at an electricity substation. 

A fire at an electricity substation near Heathrow Airport in London grounded hundreds of flights with knock-on effects on countries worldwide including Ireland — another reminder of how dependent we are on such key infrastructure. Picture: Maja Smiejkowska/PA
A fire at an electricity substation near Heathrow Airport in London grounded hundreds of flights with knock-on effects on countries worldwide including Ireland — another reminder of how dependent we are on such key infrastructure. Picture: Maja Smiejkowska/PA

There were initial concerns it could be sabotage, but it turned out to be an accident. But the vulnerability of the airport and lack of backup electricity supply was another warning to society.

That incident came against a background of a disproportionately high number of incidents involving damage to key data cables and energy pipelines in the Baltic Sea, with Russia suspected of being behind at least some of them. There have been linked concerns regarding Russia’s so-called dark fleet — ageing, anonymous vessels used to bypass oil sanctions and/or to interfere with cables by dropping their anchors on the sea floor — vessels also seen in Irish waters.

Days after the European Commission call to pack an emergency bag, German intelligence warned that Russia could be fully prepared for a “large-scale conventional war” by the end of the decade. 

In a joint report, the civilian and military intelligence agencies said that, since 2022, Russia has escalated its hybrid warfare campaign against the West, to destabilise European societies and undermine support for Ukraine.

Last November, Ireland was at the centre of highly suspicious behaviour by the well-known Russian subsea ‘spy ship’, the Yantar, as it sailed up the Celtic Sea and into the Irish Sea, loitering over an area clustered with data cables between Ireland and Britain — and even more importantly over our two gas  pipelines from Scotland and a crucial electricity interconnector between Ireland and Wales.

A senior security source told the Irish Examiner: “The electricity outages that caused all the problems in Storm Éowyn was more on the electricity distribution side, and it made life difficult and uncomfortable for a lot of people.

“But if one of the two gas pipelines is cut or the electricity interconnector is damaged, we are in a whole world of hurt very quickly. If the two gas pipelines go and/or the interconnector is cut, you literally face the danger of going dark and you could have the choice of keeping data centres going or hospitals going. Bear in mind: Backup generators might last two or three days." 

In March, the Irish Examiner reported that the Government sought an inspection on one of Ireland’s two gas pipelines from Britain to ensure it had not been tampered with by the Yantar. Gas Networks Ireland examined a 10km stretch of the pipeline, but did not find anything suspicious.

However, Fianna Fáil TD Malcolm Byrne said it was a “reality check” of the risks Ireland faced.

Just over two and a half years ago, just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a flotilla of Russian naval ships held a military exercise on the edge of Ireland’s exclusive economic zone, which stretches 200 nautical miles from the coast. 

The Russian vessels positioned themselves over a cluster of transatlantic data cables connecting North America to Ireland, Britain, and France. The action was seen in Ireland and Europe as a blatant display of military provocation.

‘Critical infrastructure’ is a term mentioned a lot, but it can be vague. EU definitions of it span 11 sectors of the economy — from finance to health (remember the crippling HSE cyber attack in 2021), to electricity and public administration. The backbone for Ireland is the electricity cables, the gas pipelines, and the data cables.

Data cables

Subsea data cables are probably the piece of kit we most often hear about when we hear about critical infrastructure. Of the 17 data cables landing on Irish shores, most are connected to Britain, four to the US, and the remainder to Iceland and another eventually, off a spur from a cable, to Denmark. 

In addition, up to eight cables pass through or near Ireland’s exclusive economic zone on their way to land to England and France — making the security of data cables going through Irish waters all the more important for fellow EU member states and Britain.

Data cables have been described by former Nato deputy boss David Cattler as an “economic lynchpin”, which not only enable access to the internet for individuals, businesses, and governments but are also the lifeblood of global financial systems.

Last May, in a public consultation on the future of digital connectivity, the Department of Environment, Climate and Communications stated: “Many industry applications depend critically on reliable, fast broadband, including financial trading, e-commerce, and cloud computing,”

Not only is broadband playing an increasing role in education, health, and agriculture, it enables everything from remote working, to streaming movies, to gaming, and keeping teenagers and adults attached to the social media feeds.

Supporting documentation in the department’s consultation said: “As a high-tech, island economy, Ireland’s international telecommunications connectivity via subsea cables is essential. Demand for capacity of subsea cables is projected to grow considerably over the next decade.”

It said there is redundancy and resilience with subsea cables, meaning if one cable is damaged, whether deliberately or accidentally, backup cables continue connections.

But it added: “Where connectivity is overly reliant on a small number of routes, such as is the case between Ireland and the UK, redundancy is lacking.” An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published last November, said: “Europe’s dependence on digital connectivity is also a dependence on submarine cables.”

It said that for “most” of Europe there are redundancies in cases of widespread internet outages or delays: “A total internet blackout scenario is far-fetched for most, if not all Europeans.”

But it added: “Nevertheless, European island countries such as Cyprus, Ireland, or Malta, or islands off the coast of the European mainland, are more vulnerable to attacks against their limited number of subsea cables.” It said cable sabotage, which could cause delays or temporary outages, would be a low-cost way of “unnerving societies” by undermining their sense of security. It said that even a modest disruption could have “drastic consequences” for European and global financial markets, adding that repair capabilities are limited and can take time.

How well set-up Ireland’s tech giants and related data centres are to connectivity losses is unclear but sources said these huge billion-dollar companies have backups and resilience built in.

There are over 80 data centres in Ireland, with some 14 under construction. Dublin is estimated to be the third-largest ‘hyperscale’ data centre hub in the world. These massive centres, owned and operated by tech giants such as Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft, provide key services far beyond Ireland, to Europe and farther afield, and will play a major role in the AI revolution.

In its submission to the Department of Environment, Climate and Communications consultation, Microsoft said there was “an urgent need for more subsea cable capacity and greater diversity of both cable routes and cable landing points”. It said the physical security of subsea cable infrastructure was of “critical importance”.

The threats to cables go beyond cutting or damaging them. In terms of espionage, concerns have been expressed that security services could tap them at landing stations — as Britain’s GCHQ and the US’s NSA have previously done.

Back in December 2019, an officer in the Irish naval service cited research showing that 97% of all data passed along the ocean floor in data cables and that around 75% of all transatlantic cables in the northern hemisphere passed through or near Irish waters.

“Our role in protecting the global network is becoming increasing evident,” Lieutenant Shane Mulcahy said, in the paper in the Defence Forces Review. He said most transatlantic cables transit past the Irish coast through a funnel less than 100 miles wide. He warned that they were a “soft military target” and any unwitnessed tampering can usually be “plausibly denied”.

Lt Mulcahy cited the presence of the Yantar in Irish waters, pointing out it had two submersibles capable of working at depths of 6,000m.

Some might argue that — given the size of Ireland’s exclusive economic zone and our neutral status — Ireland can’t afford to put the huge amount of resources in to provide proper security to maritime infrastructure.

Lt Mulcahy said: “It is worth remembering however that as an island that has successfully grown a digital economy on a fragile maritime infrastructure, Ireland may have the most to lose.” He added: “Ireland must become proactive towards securing the maritime domain on which our contemporary, digital society depends.”

Despite this, he said, the naval service had no capacity to scan sub sea: “Without systems capable of subsurface detection linked to data analysis systems ashore, the naval service remains quite literally, lost in the dark.”

Lt (now Lt Cmdr) Mulcahy advocated the use of autonomous underwater vehicles and sensors. He said New Zealand provided a cost-effective approach to subsea vessels that would be “worth following”: they examined 150 existing offshore subsea support vessels, identified one and, in 10 months, refitted it at a cost of €60m.

Energy security

Of even greater significance for the functioning, even survival, of the nation is energy and the infrastructure around it — from gas pipelines to electricity interconnectors to planned offshore wind farms.

In its 2023 annual report, the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) said that despite “meaningful” growth in renewable energy, in Ireland fossil fuels “still dominate” the country’s energy supply.

Gas pipelines

And the bulk of that comes from abroad — gas through just two pipelines from Scotland and oil by sea, primarily from the UK, into the country’s ports and refineries.

SEAI figures show around 80% of all Irish energy is imported, compared to an EU average of 55%.

The Department of Taoiseach’s 2024 national risk assessment said 82% of Ireland’s energy needs came from imports in 2022 — 48% from oil and 31% from gas.

It said that 74% of Ireland’s natural gas comes from two pipelines, Interconnector 1 and 2, from the same source in Moffat, Scotland. Those pipelines run partly parallel to the Isle of Man, before branching apart towards Meath and Dublin.

This general area was where the Yantar spent a lot of time last November.

The national risk assessment said that, unlike other European countries, Ireland has limited diversity of supply, and no gas storage. Last month the Government approved the development of a temporary emergency facility for importing and storing liquefied natural gas. The Government said the lack of such a facility was a risk in the event of damage to one or both of its subsea gas interconnectors. Northern Ireland is years ahead on establishing a similar storage facility.

The national risk assessment said declining Corrib production will mean that, pending Ireland’s promised transformation to renewable energy, our import dependence will actually rise, to 90%.

Electricity interconnectors

Separate to the gas pipelines, there are three electricity interconnectors between the island of Ireland — two of which are in the Republic — and Britain.

 

It includes Eirgrid’s east-west interconnector which runs via subsea cables running between converter stations in Ireland and Wales.

A second electricity connector (Moyle) runs between Northern Ireland and Scotland. Construction of a third electricity link, the Greenlink Interconnector, has been completed and it is due to be commissioned this year. It is a privately-owned asset, but is connected to Eirgrid, in Wexford, and the British equivalent in Wales.

In March, Greenlink’s owners, Partners Group, announced that it had sold Greenlink to Baltic Cable AB and Equitix. Baltic Cable AB is a German firm which has owned and operated the Baltic Cable interconnector between Sweden and Germany for over 30 years. Equitix is an investor in offshore transmission. 

Bearing in mind that the UK is no longer part of the EU, the Celtic Interconnector — between east Cork and Brittany in France — will be Ireland’s first interconnector to continental Europe and the EU. It is being developed by Eirgrid and its French equivalent and received €530.7m from the European Commission’s Connecting Europe Facility. Construction is due to be completed in 2026 and it could be operational by 2027.

“We need to focus on the really critical infrastructure — the two gas pipelines and the two electricity interconnectors we have,” a senior security source said.

“If data cables are cut, the global internet traffic can be rerouted to another cables, but you can’t reroute a gas pipeline or an interconnector. And don’t forget Dublin Port, Cork Harbour, Rosslare Port — if they had a cyberattack that closed them down they could run out of diesel, in order to power generators, in 48 hours or so.”

The interconnectors — with at least four others planned by the Government — are crucial not only to securing energy supply but also, potentially, in exporting energy under Government plans to massively increase domestic energy production through offshore wind farms.

Eirgrid warned on March 25 that demand for electricity is expected to grow by 45% from its 2023 level to 2034, due in large part to data centre demand, electrification of heat, and transport.

In 2021, the climate action plan set a target of 80% of electricity supply coming from renewable energy by 2030, with offshore wind farms accounting for a portion of that.

The department said a cross-government offshore wind delivery taskforce will drive implementation of the phases.

Offshore power generation

As it stands, Ireland still has only one offshore wind farm, at Arklow Bank. Wind Farm (See Map 4 — Offshore Wind Farms). shows Six more are due under phase one.

The Department of Environment, Climate and Communications said these projects will provide enough energy to power over 2.5m Irish homes by 2030. A second phase, Tonn Nua, in the south coast designated maritime area plan, is due to go up for auction later in 2025.

Warning

Two years ago, two of Ireland’s leading academics on maritime security published a lengthy paper on Ireland’s maritime security and subsea infrastructure, and how Ireland would deal with a crisis.

Robert McCabe, assistant professor and director of the MA maritime security programme at Coventry University, and Brendan Flynn, a lecturer in the School of Political Science and Sociology at University of Galway, said: “In Ireland, maritime security remains an under-prioritised and poorly understood area for policy makers, reflected in a long history of underinvestment in the Irish naval service and in the maritime security of the State.”

Their paper, published in the journal European Security in April 2023, said there was a “siloed, hierarchical and overly bureaucratic” approach to maritime security.

They said Ireland’s strategic position enabled it to act as a global hub for data centres, which the government recognised was a “core digital infrastructure” playing an “indispensable role” in the Irish economy.

The authors highlighted the position of the bulk of transatlantic cables — off Ireland’s south and north west coasts — as they connect to Europe: “This spatial concentration reveals how small states like Ireland can be pivotal for the wider security of allied and friendly neighbours' states. However, given the inherent resource and capacity restraints of smaller states, they may also serve as a weak link.”

University of Galway maritime security specialist Brendan Flynn: 'In Ireland, maritime security remains an under-prioritised and poorly understood area for policy makers, reflected in a long history of underinvestment in the Irish naval service and in the maritime security of the State. Picture: Neil Michael
University of Galway maritime security specialist Brendan Flynn: 'In Ireland, maritime security remains an under-prioritised and poorly understood area for policy makers, reflected in a long history of underinvestment in the Irish naval service and in the maritime security of the State. Picture: Neil Michael

The authors said the fact was that the naval service did not have the “required subsurface capabilities or enough assets at sea at any one time” to undertake broader maritime security responsibilities of the state.

“The [naval service’s] current vessels are austere and lack Nato standard sonars capable of detecting, classifying and tracking either submarines or submersibles,” they said.

They said other countries have taken a “more proactive” approach and said the UK had commissioned two undersea surveillance ships and that Sweden already had that capability.

The authors said that while acts of criminal damage or sabotage of subsea infrastructure are rare, the potential impact is substantial, particularly for Ireland.

“Therefore, contingency planning and capacity building to monitor, detect and deter hostile acts against such infrastructure is critically important for states such as Ireland.

“Apart from the physical and economic damage arising from a large scale disruption, the reputational damage to Ireland as a ‘gateway to Europe’ would likely be profound with potential negative impact of foreign direct investment, which accounted for 28% of the State’s nominal GDP in 2022.”

A summary of Ireland's possible future offshore energy generation. Source: Researchgate.net
A summary of Ireland's possible future offshore energy generation. Source: Researchgate.net

They pointed out that a tender was issued in “mid-2022” for a multi-beam echo sounder to be fitted into four naval service vessels.

The paper outlines the complicated legislative picture, both domestically and internationally, regarding protection of maritime infrastructure, whether above or below sea level. They said this was further complicated by governance structures, with at least five departments, multiple agencies, private owners and operators of cables. In addition, the naval service is not a formal partner at operational level.

They said the lack of a national maritime security strategy — although stated by the government in 2022 as being under consideration — was a major gap.

The authors characterised a policy and practice amounting to “seablindness”, which it said was reflected in Ireland lack of airspace security.

They wrote: “This means that Ireland has traditionally, and largely unofficially, relied on its neighbour Britain to undertake the ‘heavy lifting’ in terms of defence,” citing incidents of the RAF being scrambled to monitor Russian bombers that had entered Irish airspace.

They welcomed government statements that it was giving “deep consideration” to joining Nato’s new critical undersea infrastructure coordination cell, boosting intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

Crisis management

The authors said Ireland “lacks the capacity” to launch an effective response to a crisis to subsea or offshore infrastructure. They said that if there was an act of sabotage on a cable, the private owner would, if the incident is within territorial waters contact the gardaí — who are the lead agency in law, but lacking maritime assets apart from a water unit. If outside the 12-mile zone, they would contact the Coast Guard, but this has no mandated security role.

Bizarrely, the naval service is not tasked in law in this area: “The [naval service] is not the lead agency with responsibility for monitoring and responding to security events related to subsea infrastructure despite its broad maritime security remit.”

But, in practice, they said the naval service does, as seen its efforts against the Yantar. They said the law should be changed to designate the naval service as the “lead agency” and not An Garda Síochána or the Coast Guard.

The authors said greater use of technologies, such as autonomous systems and uncrewed vessels and aerial drones “should be considered” to picture a better maritime picture.

They noted the purchase of two CASA C-295 maritime surveillance aircraft “which while capable, lack advanced sonar and sonobuoy equipment”.

They recommended a maritime security agency and the setting up of a national critical infrastructure committee to coordinate and manage a crisis, including sabotage — supported by an intelligence gathering capacity.

They said closer cooperation with the EU and Nato was an “obvious method” of enhancing intelligence, training and technology on maritime infrastructure protection.

They said the long-time underfunding of maritime security capacity and the retention crisis in the naval service meant the country had a “limited ability” to know what was happening on or below the sea.

“The muddled governance picture means that coordinating a response in the event of a malicious act against a subsea cable or pipeline predominantly falls on the private sector to manage in the first instance,” they said.

On the often-heard claim that Ireland is a “weak link” for security in Europe, they said: “Because Ireland is not a Nato member means any, possibly Russian, intelligence or sabotage operation in the Irish exclusive economic zone or even territorial waters has lower diplomatic risk.

“Indeed the logic of horizontal escalation would make it a plausible and lower risk strategy for raising the stakes with Nato countries by hitting them indirectly via critical infrastructure that passes through a non-Nato state.”

The authors said other small states do not underspend on their military or naval capabilities “to the same extent or for so long”.

“The result is a cumulative lack of credible subsea security capability whose implications are possibly stark not least for Ireland but also for the wider EU and Nato,” they concluded.

Despite the stark analysis of these experts, the capabilities of the naval service has continued to deteriorate — reflected in falling numbers of personnel, operational vessels, and days on patrol.

Of the theoretical eight vessels in the fleet, four are operational, with fishery protection being the main task. There are two operational long-range patrol vessels (P60), but only one can be out at any time and there are two operational inshore vessels (P70), with one out at a time, with some sources even doubting that. These assets are tasked with monitoring and patrolling an area around seven times Ireland’s land mass.

Last February, the Irish Examiner reported that the number of naval service patrol days have halved in the last five years, dropping from 1,007 in 2020, to 790 in 2022 and to 428 in 2024.

In the 2024 Defence Forces Review, published last November, Lieutenant Wietse Buwalda said: “Ireland’s maritime domain remains vulnerable due to several factors: Lack of national and maritime security strategy, limited MDA [maritime domain awareness] capabilities, fragmented governance across multiple agencies, and successive government inaction.”

He said the underinvestment and personnel challenges in the naval service and the “slow pace” of government implementation of investment pitched at the second ‘level of ambition’ (LOA2) recommended by the Commission on the Defence Forces, which reported in February 2022, indicated “a lack of urgency in addressing critical gaps”.

State response

In terms of overall budget, it has long been known that Ireland is at the bottom of the European defence spending table — and this is before most of the rest of the EU has committed to significantly increasing their budget in the coming years. 

The Irish defence budget has increased — but the increase in defence spending is a smaller percentage rise than the increase in government spending as a whole. Inflation has also eaten into the increases. 

Under LOA2, the Government has committed to reach €1.5bn (in 2022 prices) by 2028. This is supposed to implement recommendations of nine operational vessels, an extra 700 navy personnel, a primary military radar and subsea sonar technology among other measure.

On the policy front, there is a mountain of strategies, plans and assessments, from a range of Government departments and organisations about securing and transforming Ireland’s energy supplies — but there is little mention in most of them about providing security for all these facilities.

The Department of the Environment’s Framework for Offshore Energy does contain two paragraphs on defence and security — but the reference to defence concerns potential interference with air defence radars (which we don’t yet have, but are promised) and at-sea patrols. It is silent on a security strategy for the physical protection of infrastructure.

The second paragraph refers to cybersecurity threats and said developments would need to align with the National Cyber Security Strategy and the EU Network and Information Systems Directive (NIS2).

The Government Offshore Wind Delivery Taskforce has representatives from seven departments — but the Department of Defence is not one of them. There are also three agencies — but the Defence Forces is not among them.

Interestingly, a non-military agency, the Marine Institute, has flagged very clearly the need for security for the booming maritime infrastructure.

In its Ocean Knowledge 2030 document it said protection of strategic maritime interests, whether infrastructure or natural resources, is “fundamental” to the sovereignty of a coastal state and that the planned surge in infrastructure was at risk of interference, damage or attack by rogue actors.

“Even in advance of large-scale deployment of offshore renewable energy installations, there is an imperative to provide effective oversight and security of existing offshore assets, particularly those on the sea bed such as energy pipelines, interconnectors, and power and telecommunication cables,” it said.

It said the ability to monitor the maritime domain — including the air, surface and subsea — was “critical” for maritime safety and security.

The Department of Defence, in its landmark Defence Policy Review 2024, published last July, said Ireland was increasingly susceptible to cyber attacks, espionage, subversion and “attacks on critical infrastructure” by state and non-state groups and cites an “increase in suspicious activity” by Russian military in the exclusive economic zone.

It said the “security of energy infrastructure”, particularly at sea will, “pose new challenges”, pointing out that the energy has to be transferred and stored as well.

“Defence will be required to support the cross-government approach to national resilience in respect of energy security, critical raw materials and associated critical infrastructure,” it said.

“The Defence Forces will provide the intelligence, situational awareness and response capabilities, within means, required to secure Ireland’s strategic interests with respect to critical infrastructure, energy security, and security of critical raw materials.”

The Office of Emergency Planning in the Department of Defence also has the role of ensuring the EU critical entities directive is implemented, a considerable task as there are at least 10 Government departments and 11 sectors of the state and economy to coordinate. The directive creates a framework to ensure the critical entities can prevent, resist, absorb and recover from disruptive events, whether natural or from hostile states or gangs.

The Office of Emergency Planning is tasked with developing a national resilience strategy and carry out risk assessments on sectors involving “stress tests”.

One has been carried out on the energy industry to date, though the results are not available.

In a statement to the Irish Examiner, the Department of Defence said that, last February, a desktop exercise was conducted to test national level preparedness for hybrid threats, including 17 government departments and seven State agencies. The threat involved a cyber-incident compounded by damage to subsea cables in the Irish exclusive economic zone.

The statement also said that the Defence Forces are a full participant in six EU Pesco (permanent structured cooperation) projects with militaries from other EU members, including one on maritime surveillance, cyber threats, and critical seabed infrastructure protection. The Defence Forces are also involved in 16 projects with the European Defence Agency, including ones on cyber defence exercises and maritime surveillance.

In addition, the Defence Forces are involved in four individually tailored partnership programmes (ITPP) with Nato, including one on cyber and hybrid threats, resilience and maritime security.

Small steps

Despite statements in September and October 2023 from then defence minister and now Taoiseach Micheál Martin that Ireland’s involvement in the Nato Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell was under “active consideration”, indications repeated again in May 2024, the Department of Defence told the Irish Examiner that Ireland was “not a participant” in the cell and made no reference to whether it is still under consideration.

When we queried this, the department said the involvement of partner nations (which includes Ireland) in the cell “has yet to be agreed by Nato” and that Ireland’s relationship with Nato was through the individually-tailored partnership programmes.

The European Commission has published a number of documents on critical infrastructure and reliance and has a task force with Nato on the issue. The EU cyber agency, ENISA, has also produced analysis and documents on the threats.

 British prime minister Kier Starmer and Taoiseach Micheál Martin with their respective delegations at the first UK-Ireland Summit in March. Picture: Peter Byrne/PA
British prime minister Kier Starmer and Taoiseach Micheál Martin with their respective delegations at the first UK-Ireland Summit in March. Picture: Peter Byrne/PA

The Irish National Cyber Security Centre has responsibility for cyber security for critical infrastructure and for implementation of various EU cyber directives, including NIS 2. The centre is set to get significant more powers under a bill, the heads of which were published last July, but pre-legislative scrutiny has not started yet, so the final bill could be a while away yet.

At the first UK-Ireland Summit last month, Taoiseach Micheál Martin and British prime minister Kier Starmer agreed to work closely on cooperation in maritime security, cybersecurity, sea mapping, offshore energy and electricity interconnection.

The Government and the Department of Defence have said the primary radar and subsea sonar were priority actions under LOA2. Asked for an update, the department said work on delivering the radar was ongoing and that “good progress is being made”. It said the initial delivery date was 2028. It said a previous competition for a sonar was cancelled after an assessment of tenders was “inconclusive”.

It said the intention was to “return to the market in the near future”, but no timeline was provided.

The department also said the Maritime Security Strategy was also a priority, but was an “extensive undertaking” and could not say when it would be completed.

Commenting, University of Galway politics lecturer Brendan Flynn said the maritime strategy “has been promised for years and has failed to materialise”, adding that this has long been the case for the National Security Strategy, first expected to be published in 2021, but still awaited.

He said maritime security and subsea cable protection was supposed to be “priority action” for the Government, but said: “To be honest, I don’t see priority action evident. I see small steps being taken which in time will improve things but events are racing far ahead.”

Ten steps to make Irish maritime security more resilient

1. Buy military radar and subsea sonar

Three years on from the Commission on Defence Forces (CoDF) report, the tenders for these “paramount”, and basic, military equipment, have still not been issued.

2. Boost Ireland’s naval fleet

The commission’s report (CoDF LOA2) recommended nine operational vessels under the ‘level of ambition 2’. The naval service has eight vessels but  only one or two  can go out at any given time due to the staffing crisis. The Government said in February that “planning is underway for the potential procurement of a multi-role vessel”.  This was mentioned in the 2015 Defence White Paper and repeated regularly since.

3. Improve recruitment and retention

All potential operations and plans for the naval service are constrained by its capabilities, primarily its personnel — almost half what it needs to be. 

There are signs of a stabilisation in the crisis in Defence Forces’ strength, with inductions for the navy exceeding the numbers leaving last year. Significant increases in salary have helped, but there continues to be concern at the low numbers of navy personnel able to benefit from the doubling of patrol duty allowance — because of limited patrols. Salary rises will need to match cost of living to assist with retention.

4. Formalise bilateral military agreements

While there are long-standing informal arrangements with the British navy, in particular, Ireland has no choice but to deepen and preferably formalise cooperation with the British and French navies, to maximise intelligence-sharing and assist with our limited capabilities.

5. Join Nato critical undersea infrastructure coordination cell

This would bring the naval service into the loop of Nato intelligence.

6. Expedite the maritime security strategy

This should examine the creation of a maritime security agency and clarify complex maritime law and governance structures. 

The strategy could decide that the top strategic priority should be ‘maritime domain awareness’ — basically knowing what is going on in our exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 24/7 and what the threats are. In addition to the primary land-based military radar and subsea sonar, we need a coastal radar system and a remote sensing system — commercial satellites that provide high-resolution images of our EEZ. 

This capability would also be of benefit to gardaí and Customs combating drug trafficking. 

Subsea investment could include laying acoustic sensors and other smart sensing technology along critical infrastructure, namely gas pipelines and electricity interconnectors.

Some sources put the costs of above-sea surveillance systems at around €20m, with the subsea surveillance at around €5m, which is low in military terms. But naval service staff are needed to do this work. 

Further investment in submersibles and strengthening of the naval service’s diving section would be good.

7. Set up a maritime security agency/centre

There is a need for an independent body that brings together the naval service, air corps, gardaí, Customs, the departments of defence, justice, environment and transport, and State agencies including Mara, Eirgrid, Gas Networks Ireland and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). 

There should be a lead agency, probably the naval service, and staff would be seconded, and security vetted (we also need a robust national security vetting system). The British Joint Maritime Security Centre could be a good model.

8. An expanded Department of Defence

Renaming it to the Department of Defence, Emergency Planning, Critical Infrastructure and Resilience would recognise and deepen the expanded role of the department. 

It would ensure that security of critical infrastructure is embedded in critical infrastructure resourcing, policy and practice. The Maritime Security Agency could sit within the department.

9. We need a full-time defence minister

Having a Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, based in Dublin, being also Minister for Defence, based in Kildare, is too big a brief.

10. Reformed national security structures

The National Security Strategy is four years overdue. The troubled National Security Analysis Centre appears to be downsizing, re-establishing a gap in the coordination of national security services.

The programme for government committed to an examination of national security structures, to report within six months. There is no sign of this review even starting.

A national intelligence agency/centre should bring together under one roof garda security and intelligence, military intelligence, NCSC, the new Maritime Security Agency, and other bodies, as well as civilian experts — with a lead agency, probably An Garda Síochána.

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